Mercer Law Review
Volume 64
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 4

7-2013

Class Actions
Thomas M. Byrne
Stacey McGavin Mohr

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Byrne, Thomas M. and Mohr, Stacey McGavin (2013) "Class Actions," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 64 : No. 4 ,
Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol64/iss4/4

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Class Actions
by Thomas M. Byrne*
and Stacey McGavin Mohr**
This year saw the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit set the ground rules for collateral attacks on class settlements
and elaborate on the predominance requirements for class certification.'
The court also considered the enforceability of a, variety of arbitration
provisions in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion2 and examined standing issues
common in data security breach class actions.
I.

COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A LIMITED FUND SETTLEMENT

In Juris v. Inamed Corp.,3 the Eleventh Circuit considered several
issues related to the ability of an absent class member to collaterally
attack a "limited fund" class settlement. In 1999, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama had approved a
mandatory, limited fund class settlement under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(1)(B) 4 resolving thousands of claims arising from
injuries allegedly caused by defective silicone breast implants manufac* Partner in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Notre Dame (A.B., cum laude, 1978; J.D., magna cum laude, 1981). Law
clerk to the Hon. Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and to the Hon. Morey L. Sear of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
Emory University (BA, 2001); Duke University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude,
2007). Law clerk to the Hon. Karen Nelson Moore of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Eleventh Circuit class action law during the prior survey period,
see Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin Mohr, ClassActions, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 63
MERCER L. REv. 1183 (2012).

2. 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
3. 685 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3274 (Jan. 14, 2013). The
opinion of the court was authored by Judge R. Lanier Anderson III.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
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tured by Inamed.5 The settlement fund was conditioned on the
inclusion of an anti-suit injunction that encompassed not only current
injury claims but also any claims based on future injuries. In 2006,
after discovering she had been injured by the allegedly defective
implants, Zuzanna Juris filed an individual action in California state
court against Inamed and its successor. The defendants filed a demurrer
in the California court on res judicata grounds, to which Juris responded
that the application of res judicata would deprive her of due process.
The defendants then filed a motion in the Alabama district court
requesting that Juris and her attorney show cause why they could not
be held in contempt for violating the anti-suit injunction, and the parties
jointly requested that the California action be stayed pending a decision
from the Alabama district court.'
Rejecting Juris's many arguments-based on the application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), due process, and the
Anti-Injunction Act 7-the district court ruled that the class settlement
and anti-suit injunction precluded the California action under the
doctrine of res judicata and denied Juris's due process challenge.'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a lengthy opinion addressing several
aspects of the limited fund class action, the res judicata effect of prior
settlements, and due process. The court first concluded that Juris could
collaterally attack the res judicata effect of the settlement, but that she
must show that application of res judicata would be inconsistent with
due process.9 Specifically, she would have to show that the prior
proceeding lacked adequate representation or notice or that the absence
of opt-out rights amounted to a denial of due process.'0 The court left
open the question of whether such collateral review must be limited to
preclude Juris from raising arguments already raised and rejected in the
class action court, ultimately concluding that, even considering these
arguments, Juris could not show a violation of due process."
Before proceeding to the due process arguments, the court addressed
Juris's contention that the California state court, rather than the
Alabama district court, was the proper forum for her collateral attack. 2
The court ultimately dismissed this argument on the basis that Juris
had herself consented to jurisdiction by filing a joint motion staying the

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Juris,685 F.3d at 1301, 1306.
Id. at 1308-10.
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
Juris,685 F.3d at 1310-12.
Id. at 1312-14.
Id. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1314 n.16.
Id. at 1314.
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California action and also had abandoned the argument by not raising
it below.13 First, however, the court discussed at some length the
implications of a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Services Antitrust
Litigation,4 which held that if an absent class member has not been
given the opportunity to opt out in a class action involving injunctive
relief and damages claims, the member could not be "haled across the
country" but must either have minimum contacts with the forum or
consent to jurisdiction in order to be enjoined by the district court that
entertained the class action. 5 Real Estate, however, did not involve a
limited fund settlement, and the Third Circuit had specifically stated
that it was not addressing the due process requirements in a limited
fund class action. 6 And because Juris had consented to jurisdiction,
the Eleventh Circuit did not address the issue left open in Real Estate:
"[Wihether, in the absence of her express consent to jurisdiction, it would
have run afoul of the due process clause to require Juris to litigate her
collateral
attack on the limited fund settlement in the certifying
7
court."'

Turning to the merits of Juris's due process argument, the court
considered in sequence her three possible bases: notice, representation,
and lack of opt-out rights. '8 As to notice, the court rejected Juris's
argument that she was entitled to actual, individual notice of the
proposed settlement, focusing instead on whether the notice was
sufficient to produce a hearing that was adversarial in nature. 9
Although Rule 23 does not require notice for 23(b)(1) classes, the
Eleventh Circuit had previously held in In re Temple2 1 that due process
will require some notice beyond adequate representation in a 23(b)(1)(B)
class action, given its mandatory nature. 1 In Temple, however, no

13. Id. at 1314-16 & n.19.
14. 869 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989).
15. Juris,685 F.3d at 1314-15.
16. Id. at 1315 (quoting Real Estate, 869 F.2d at 768).
17. Id. at 1316.
18. Id. at 1316-33.
19. Id. at 1316-21. Noting that it was not fairly raised in Juris's briefs, the court left
open the question of whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Amchem
Products,Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), dictates that notice to exposure-only, future
claimants can ever be constitutionally sufficient. The district court had distinguished the
current situation because, unlike the claimants in Amchem, who may not have known that
they had even been exposed to asbestos at the time of the settlement, class members here
knew that they had been exposed to the implants, even if no injury was yet apparent.
Juris, 685 F.3d at 1327 n.21.
20. 851 F.2d 1269 (11th Cir. 1988).
21. Juris,685 F.3d at 1318.
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notice had been provided, making it essentially an ex parte proceeding." Temple therefore does not require actual, individual notice, just
enough notice to prevent the certification proceeding from being
essentially non-adversarial: "Where the notice afforded reaches a critical
mass of putative class members, such that the facts underlying
certification are contested and approached in a sufficiently adversarial
manner, the due process pitfall identified in Temple can be avoided."2 3
Here, the court directed the distribution of individual notices to tens of
thousands of claimants, and notices were published in multiple national
publications. Moreover, class members who had no manifest injury were
at the hearing and represented Juris's interests, making the proceeding
"sufficiently adversarial."2 4 Indeed, Juris could think of no objection
that she would have raised that was not actually raised by objectors at
the hearing.25 The court therefore refused to hold that actual, individual notice is necessary for a 23(b)(1)(B) class.26
The court similarly rejected Juris's argument that her interests were
not adequately represented during the certification proceedings, again
pointing out their adversarial nature. Juris argued that the Supreme
Court's decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor 28 and Ortiz v.
FibreboardCorp. 29 both of which involved plaintiffs claiming asbestosrelated injuries, required the creation of two distinct subclasses-one
composed of plaintiffs with current injuries and one for plaintiffs with
only potential, future injuries-with separate class representatives for
each.3" In Amchem, the Court had reversed the grant of class certification based on failure to meet Rule 23(a)(4)'s 31 adequate representation
requirement.3 2 There, the "'sprawling class' included not only presently
injured [plaintiffs], but also those who had only been exposed to
asbestos" but had no manifest injury, so that the interests of the
currently injured in having immediate payment cut directly against
those of the potentially injured in having an ample fund for the
future.3 3 The Court subsequently held in Ortiz that this same principle

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 1319 (citing Temple, 851 F.3d at 1272).
Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1322-29.
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
527 U.S. 815 (1999).
Juris,685 F.3d at 1322-23.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4).
Juris,685 F.3d at 1322 (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625).
Id. (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 602-03).
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of Rule 23(a)(4) was applicable to consideration of the propriety of
certification of a limited fund class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 34 The
Eleventh Circuit clarified, however, that Amchem and Ortiz simply
require that there be structural assurances of adequate representation
to protect against conflicting goals: "[P]rotections must ensure that class
representatives understand that their role is representing solely
members of their respective constituency, not the whole class."35 But
such protections need not necessarily be in the form of formal subclasses.
Amchem and Ortiz, moreover, involved a direct appeal of a Rule 23
certification, not a collateral attack, and the Eleventh Circuit refused to
go so far as to hold that due process requires formal subclasses.3 6
Again, the procedures in Juris adequately protected against antagonistic
alignment within the class: the named plaintiffs had a range of injuries,
from current to potential, and separate counsel was brought in to
represent the future injury plaintiffs.37
The court likewise concluded that due process did not require that
Juris be given opt-out rights.3" Juris's argument was based primarily
on her lack of contacts with Alabama, which she claimed had deprived
the court of personal jurisdiction,39 giving her a constitutional right to
opt out under the Supreme Court's decision in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v.
Shutts.4 ° Shutts, which involved a money damages class, held that the
class action court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over absent
class members because certain procedural protections, such as opt-out
rights, were present.4 1 Shutts, however, would not apply where an
independent basis for personal jurisdiction exists, such as in a limited
fund class action, where the presence of the res in the district of the
forum court provides such jurisdiction.4 2 Here, the limited recovery
fund had been deposited in a settlement account in Alabama, giving the
Alabama district court jurisdiction. 43 Noting that it was not fairly
raised on appeal, the court declined to address the broader argument of
whether opt-out rights are required even where personal jurisdiction
exists."

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1323 (citing Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856).
Id.
Id. at 1323-24.
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1329-33.
Id. at 1329.
472 U.S. 797 (1985).
Juris,685 F.3d at 1329-30.
Id. at 1330-32.
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1333 n.40.
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Having concluded that Juris was not deprived of due process, the court
dispensed with her argument that certification of the class had not met
the requirements of Rule 23, concluding that the district court properly
held such arguments precluded by res judicata.4" First, however, the
court reviewed the minimum requirements for certification of a limited
fund class under Rule 23, as described in Ortiz, and noted that Ortiz left
open the questions of what more might be needed and whether a
mandatory limited fund can be used to settle tort claims.46 Again
noting that Ortiz was a direct appeal of a Rule 23 certification and not
a collateral attack in which the issues were limited to whether due
process was met, the court declined to reach these questions.4 7
Finally, the court rejected Juris's argument that the Anti-Injunction
Act barred the district court from enjoining her California state court
action."
Citing multiple alternative rationales for its conclusion,
including that the Act would not apply because the anti-suit injunction
was issued before the California action was even initiated, the court
found that both the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" and the relitigation
exceptions applied, allowing an injunction.4 9
In concluding its opinion, the court was careful to emphasize the
collateral posture of the case and that the original order certifying the
class and approving the settlement was not before the court on direct
appeal.5 ° Larger questions about the nature of limited fund classes in
a post-Ortiz world-such as the requirements of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class
and whether a limited fund class ever should be used to settle aggregated tort claims-remain unanswered. Juris instead underscores the long
odds facing absent class members attempting to collaterally attack class
certification and settlement.

45. Id. at 1334-36.
46. Id. at 1334.
47. Id. at 1336. The court also declined to reach the issue, raised by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint Eastern &
Southern District Asbestos Litigation), 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), of whether the use of
a limited fund class in situations where there is a likelihood that an aggregate of tort
claims would render a defendant insolvent would improperly circumvent the protections
of the Bankruptcy Code. In dismissing this argument, the court noted the Supreme Court's
statement in Ortiz that "there is no inherent conflict between a limited fund class action
under Rule 23(b)(1XB) and the Bankruptcy Code." Juris, 685 F.3d at 1336 n.44 (quoting
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 860 n.34).
48. Juris,685 F.3d at 1338-40.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1340.
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CLASS CERTIFICATION

The year also saw the Eleventh Circuit review denials of class
certification in two related cases, both focusing on the predominance of
individual over class issues. Coastal Neurology, Inc. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co."l and DWFII Corp. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.52 both involved claims by health care
providers who delivered services to individuals covered under State
Farm's no-fault personal injury protection and billed State Farm under
an assignment of benefits. The providers claimed that State Farm's use
of National Correct Coding Initiative (NCCI) edits to limit the providers'
reimbursements violated Florida's no-fault law53 and sought to certify
classes of providers who had had claims reduced or denied by State
Farm based on an NCCI edit.54 Both cases were before the same
district judge in the Southern District of Florida, who denied class
certification in both cases, based primarily on the failure to meet the
typicality prerequisite for class certification under Rule 23(a)55 and the
predominance requirement for a Rule 23(b)(3) class. 6
The Eleventh Circuit made short work of affirming the denials of class
certification. First, in Coastal Neurology, the court concluded that the
district court did not err in taking into account the individualized
defenses that State Farm would have to the proposed class members'
claims, as the court had previously held in Klay v. Humana, Inc.57 that
the predominance analysis "must take into account the claims, defenses,
relevant facts, and applicable substantive law."58 Citing several of its
previous class action opinions, as well as the Supreme Court's decision
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,59 the court reaffirmed that, although
the district court may not resolve the merits of claims, "the court may,
and sometimes must, inquire into the merits in order to determine
whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied." ° And the

51.
52.
53.
54.

458 F. App'x 793 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
469 F. App'x 762 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (2011).
Coastal Neurology, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 538,542 (S.D.

Fla. 2010); DWFII Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 676, 681 (S.D. Fla.
2010).
55. Coastal Neurology, Inc., 271 F.R.D. at 547; DWFII, 271 F.R.D. at 687-88.
56. Coastal Neurology, Inc., 271 F.R.D. at 544-45; DWFII, 271 F.R.D. at 685.
57. 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004).
58. Coastal Neurology, Inc., 458 F. App'x at 794 (quoting Klay, 382 F.3d at 1254).
59. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). For a discussion of Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes in last year's
survey, see Byrne & Mohr, supra note 1, at 1183-86.
60. Coastal Neurology, Inc., 458 F. App'x at 794.
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district court's language about "permissible" and "impermissible" edits
did not indicate a foray into the merits of the case but instead was used
to differentiate the varying defenses that would be available to State
Farm in individual cases.6 1 The court also rejected the argument that
State Farm had waived its right to assert individual defenses by not
listing them in an "itemized specification" during the claims review
process, as Florida's no-fault law allows insurers to raise such defenses
to claims "at any time." 2
DWFII, decided after Coastal Neurology, also affirmed the district
court's predominance analysis, citing the same proposition from Klay"
Although the court first concluded that DWFII had not satisfied the
typicality requirement, the typicality analysis overlapped substantially
with the predominance analysis: typicality was lacking because, even
if the class could show that the NCCI edits were impermissible, "each
individual medical service provider in the class must still demonstrate
that it is entitled to reimbursement for the disputed charges," meaning
that "each claim would require the establishment of different facts and
would be subject to different defenses.'"
Again focusing on the
predominance of individualized issues, the court rejected the plaintiff's
attempt to craft a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive-relief class, concluding that
the monetary relief sought was not incidental to the requested injunctive
relief.65 Specifically, money damages are incidental only when entitlement to damages would be automatic upon a judgment of liability to the
class "and awarding them 'should not entail complex individualized
determinations."'6 6 Money damages therefore could not be incidental
given the necessity of establishing individual facts regarding the services
performed and amounts billed and reimbursed to determine the
appropriate monetary recovery.
Coastal Neurology and DWFII, although not focusing on Rule 23(a)
commonality, followed the rationale of Dukes in requiring the consideration of individualized claims and defenses and recognizing that such
examination may require inquiry into the merits of claims. Next year
may see the Eleventh Circuit more closely examine these issues as it
sees more cases involving district courts' application of Dukes, as well as

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 795.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(b).
469 F. App'x at 765.
Id. at 764-65.
Id. at 765.
Id. (quoting Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001)).
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the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. 7
III.

ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTIONS

The Eleventh Circuit dealt with a series of cases involving application
of the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,6 8
which held that the Federal Arbitration Act 9 preempts state law rules
that prohibit class action waivers in arbitration agreements.7" Most of
those cases arose from the consolidation by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) in the Southern District of Florida of
putative class actions involving challenges to bank overdraft fees. The
MDL proceeding was assigned to Judge James L. King.
In one such case, Garciav. Wachovia Corp.,1 the issue presented was
waiver of arbitration. The defendant bank sought to enforce an
arbitration provision, but the plaintiffs countered that any right to
arbitration had been waived by litigating. The district court in fact had
twice invited the bank to move to compel arbitration, first in 2009 and
again in 2010, but the bank declined those invitations,72 likely because
of concerns that the motion might be granted and a risky class
arbitration, then a distinct possibility, might be the result. The bank
instead filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied in most respects. At
one point, the bank affirmatively stated that it declined to elect to
arbitrate the disputes and would not seek arbitration in the future.
There was extensive discovery, including approximately twenty
depositions, and other motion practice.73
In 2011, two days after the United States Supreme Court decided
Concepcion, the bank filed a motion to dismiss the five putative class
actions filed against it in favor of arbitration or for a stay pending
arbitration.74 After the district court denied this motion on the ground
that the bank had waived arbitration by proceeding with the litigation
and declining to move to arbitrate sooner, the bank appealed.75

67. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
68. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
69. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
70. 131 S.Ct. at 1753.
71. 699 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2012). The opinion for the court was authored by Judge
William H. Pryor, Jr.
72. Id. at 1275-76.
73. Id. at 1276.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1277.
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The Eleventh Circuit explained that it applies a two-part test to decide
whether a right to arbitrate has been waived by a litigant." First, the
court decides, under the totality of the circumstances, whether the
litigant has acted inconsistently with an arbitration right. 7 Second,
the court examines whether the other party has been prejudiced by the
length of delay in demanding arbitration and the expense incurred in the
litigation process.7 The court concluded that the bank acted inconsistently with its arbitration right by its failure to move for arbitration and
its statement that it did not intend to seek arbitration in the future7 9
The court also decided that the plaintiffs would suffer substantial
prejudice if arbitration were compelled, given their substantial expenditures of resources in prosecuting the litigation. 0 Finally, the court
noted that the bank benefited from conducting discovery of the
plaintiffs-a benefit to which, the court assumed, it would not have been
entitled during arbitration.8"
The bank argued that it would have been futile to move for arbitration
before Concepcion. 2 The court responded that "absent controlling
Supreme Court or circuit precedent foreclosing a right to arbitrate, a
motion to compel arbitration will almost never be futile."' The court
rejected the bank's argument that the futility doctrine excuses a failure
to move to compel arbitration even if it appears the motion would be
unlikely to succeed."
The result in Garcia is hardly surprising, given the bank's renunciation of arbitration and the duration and progress of the litigation.
Garcia can be usefully contrasted, however, with the court's 2011
decision in Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.," in which the court held
that the filing of a substantially amended complaint revived a bank's
previously waived arbitration right.8 6
Several of the overdraft fee arbitration MDL cases presented
unconscionability challenges to fee-shifting arbitration provisions. In

76. Id.
77. Id.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1278.
Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84.
85.
Byrne
86.

Id. at 1278-79.
654 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011). This decision is analyzed in the 2011 survey. See
& Mohr, supra note 1, at 1190-91.
Krinsk, 654 F.3d at 1203-04.
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Green Tree FinancialCorp.-Alabamav. Randolph, 7 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that an arbitration agreement may not be enforceable
where the costs imposed on one party were so severe that its statutory
rights could not be vindicated." The burden to demonstrate prohibitive
costs is on the party opposing arbitration.8 9 This possibility survived
Concepcion, though the issue is again before the Supreme Court during
its 2012 term. 90
In Buffington v. SunTrust Banks, Inc. (In re Checking Account
Overdraft Litigation MDL No. 2036),9' the district court had denied
SunTrust's motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the
arbitration provision in the account agreement was substantively
unconscionable under Georgia law because of its class action waiver, but
the Eleventh Circuit vacated that ruling and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Concepcion.92 On a renewed motion to
compel, after remand, the district court denied the motion on the ground
that the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable because
provisions granting SunTrust the right to recover its expenses for
arbitration allocated disproportionately to the plaintiffs the risks of error
and loss inherent in dispute resolution. 93
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit again vacated the district court's
opinion.94 There was no dispute in the district court that the arbitration provision covered the controversy between the plaintiffs and
SunTrust. But the plaintiffs argued that the provision was procedurally
unconscionable under Georgia law because it was not presented
conspicuously and was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 95 The
plaintiffs also argued that the provision was substantively unconscionable because the potential recovery was limited, yet the cost of arbitration, including the possibility of having to reimburse SunTrust for its
expenses as a prevailing party, was substantial. 9 The plaintiffs based
their arguments concerning substantive unconscionability on a provision
that stated that "[tihe prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of

87. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
88. Id. at 90-91.
89. Id. at 91-92; see Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1028 (11th
Cir. 2003).
90. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012).
91. 459 F. App'x 855 (11th Cir. 2012).
92. Id. at 856-57.
93. Id. at 858.
94. Id. at 859.
95. Id. at 857.
96. Id. at 857-58.
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the costs and expenses of the arbitration including an award of
reasonable attorneys' fees .

.

.

The Eleventh Circuit, however,

rejected these arguments."s The court reversed the district court's
holding that the arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable. 9 The court reasoned that, under Georgia law, for a contract to be
procedurally unconscionable, "[it] must be 'so one-sided' that 'no sane
man not acting under a delusion would make and that no honest man
would' participate in the transaction."0 0 The court also pointed out
that mere inequality in bargaining power was insufficient under Georgia
law to render a contract unenforceable.' °'
The court concluded that there was no merit in the plaintiffs'
arguments that the arbitration provision was insufficiently conspicuous,
noting that the provision employed bold-faced type in explaining what
kinds of disputes were subject to arbitration and that the provision was
capitalized in the table of contents in the agreement. 1 2 The court also
pointed out that the Supreme Court had invalidated state law provisions
that place arbitration provisions on unequal footing relative to other
kinds of contractual provisions, and that the plaintiffs cited no law
requiring that arbitration provisions be conspicuous.' 0 3 The court also
rejected the plaintiffs' substantive unconscionability arguments. 104
In Hough v. Regions Financial Corp. (In re Checking Account
Overdraft Litigation MDL No. 2036),"°5 a decision issued four days
after the decision in Buffington, the court rejected unconscionability
attacks under Georgia law on enforcement of another bank's arbitration
provision.0 6 Judge King had held that the provision, found in a
Regions Bank arbitration agreement, was unconscionable because it
included a class action waiver. After Concepcion was decided and that
order was vacated, Regions renewed its motion to compel, but the
district court denied the motion because of Regions's unilateral right to
recover its expenses-the same ground the court addressed in Buffington. The Regions provision capped the customer's cost for the arbitration
proceeding at $125. However, the provision also required the customer

97. Id. at 857 (alteration in original).
98. Id. at 858.
99. Id. at 858-59.
100. Id. at 858 (quoting NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390, 391 & n.2, 478 S.E.2d
769, 771 & n.2 (1996)).
101. Id. at 859.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 858.
105. 672 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012).
106. Id. at 1230.
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to reimburse Regions if it was the prevailing party for the costs of
arbitration. The provision granted Regions a setoff right for any such
award as well. 07
Regions argued in the district court that the arbitration provision
delegated all questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The plaintiffcustomers contended that the delegation of all disputes to the arbitrator
was itself substantively unconscionable. Judge King held that Regions
had waived its right to arbitrate unconscionability by asking the district
court to determine the question.'0 8
The Eleventh Circuit agreed that Regions had waived its right to
arbitrate unconscionability of its arbitration provision by failing to
invoke the delegation clause in response to the customers' arguments
about unconscionability.'0 9 The court cited its decision in Doe v.
Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd."' as presenting the same facts and dictating the same result."' The court agreed with Regions, however, that
the district court had erred on substantive unconscionability." 2 The
court specifically rejected the setoff argument, reasoning that an
arbitration provision is not unconscionable under Georgia law because
of a lack of mutuality of remedy." 3 The court also rejected the
customers' argument that the agreement was procedurally unconscionable on the same basis as the other panel's rejection of the same
4
argument in Buffington.1
In yet another appeal from the checking overdraft MDL proceeding,
Barras v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Checking Account
OverdraftLitigation MDL No. 2036),"' the court dealt with unconscionability under South Carolina law. Again, the plaintiffs in the district
court successfully attacked the fee-and-cost-shifting provision as
unconscionable. The bank, Branch Banking & Trust Company (BB&T),
appealed Judge King's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. BB&T
argued that the fee-and-cost-shifting provision did not apply to
arbitration because of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules.
Specifically, BB&T argued that the AAA rules did not provide for costshifting and superseded the provisions of the agreement." 6 But the
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court agreed with Judge King's holding that the fee-and-cost-shifting
provision was applicable to fees and costs arising from arbitration."'
Turning to unconscionability, the court noted that "'generally applicable
contract defenses'... are not preempted by the [Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),]" even under Concepcion." The court deemed South Carolina's
doctrine of unconscionability arbitration-neutral and thus enforceable,
unlike the California law at issue in Concepcion."' The court reasoned that South Carolina's unconscionability provision was free to
operate, notwithstanding the FAA, because it "is concerned with defects
in the process of contract formation." 2 °
Having determined that South Carolina's unconscionability doctrine
was not preempted by the FAA, the court turned to whether the bank's
arbitration provision was unconscionable. The court concluded that
Barras lacked a meaningful choice in agreeing to the arbitration
provision because of the element of surprise.'2 ' Although the arbitration provision itself was conspicuous, the cost-and-fee-shifting provision
was found in an entirely separate part of the account agreement, with
no cross-referencing. 2 2 A reader of the agreement, the court reasoned,
would have thought that the arbitration provision was a comprehensive
statement of all the rules governing an arbitration proceeding, but the
fee-recovery provision was found elsewhere and would not have been
discovered even on a thorough reading of the account agreement.'23
The court also determined that the agreement was substantively
unconscionable because it would have forced Barras to pay the bank's
cost of arbitration regardless of whether the bank actually prevailed in
the dispute. 1" The court remarked that this provision "contravenes
basic expectations that attorney's fees and costs generally are not
recoverable by a non-prevailing party."'25 The Eleventh Circuit also
affirmed Judge King's ruling that the bank had waived any right to
submit the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator by submitting the
126
same issue to the district court.

The court then turned to the question of remedy. BB&T argued that
the cost-and-fee-shifting provision should be severed and the balance of
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the agreement enforced. 127 Barras argued that BB&T waived its right
to argue severability by failing to raise that argument in the district
court. 2 ' The Eleventh Circuit declined to consider the waiver question, finding that under South Carolina law, the court was empowered
to limit the application of the cost-and-fee-shifting provision.1" The
court reasoned that the arbitration provision was capable of operating
independently of the unconscionable cost-and-fee-shifting provision
because of the incorporated AAA rules that governed all aspects of the
arbitration proceeding, including costs.

130

Accordingly, the court

concluded that the cost-and-fee-shifting provision was severable and that
1 BB&T thus lost most of the arguthe arbitration could proceed."
12
day.
the
won
still
ments-but
IV. DATA SECURITY BREACH CLASS ACTION
Data security breach class actions have been brought in many districts
and recently have reached the appellate courts, primarily on standing
issues." In Resnick v. AvMed, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit considered an appeal of the dismissal of a data breach class action brought in
the Southern District of Florida.'3 5 The complaint, as amended,
alleged that AvMed, a health care services business, suffered the theft
of two laptop computers stolen from its offices. The complaint alleged
that AvMed did not take care to secure the laptops and the information
on them was unencrypted. The complaint also alleged that the two
named plaintiffs, who had never before suffered identity theft, were
victims of identity theft within ten and fourteen months, respectively,
after the laptop theft. The complaint provided details of each of the
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131. Id.
132. In Powell-Perry v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 485 F. App'x 403 (11th Cir. 2012),
the court considered another BB&T appeal. The court ruled that North Carolina law
similarly permitted severance of the cost-and-fee-shifting provision from the arbitration
provision. Id. at 406-07.
133. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2395 (2012); Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2011); Krottner v.
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d
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134. 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012).
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identity thefts involved. The district court dismissed the complaint,
36
however, on the grounds that it failed to allege a cognizable injury.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first considered whether the named
plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring such an action.'3 7 In a
section of the opinion in which all judges concurred, the court held that
the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the required injury-in-fact, that the
injury was "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct, and that it was
redressable. 138
The court then turned to whether a cognizable injury had been
sufficiently alleged under Florida law.'39 The court reasoned that six
of the seven counts required a plaintiff to show that the defendant's
challenged action caused the plaintiff's harm. 40 The court noted that
it was not bound to accept the plaintiffs' legal conclusion, set out in the
complaint, that the defendant's data breach caused the identity
theft.'
But the court determined that the complaint sufficiently
alleged a nexus between the data breach and the identity thefts beyond
mere allegations of time and sequence.'4 2 Citing a Ninth Circuit
opinion, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint indicated a
logical connection between the two incidents.'43 Specifically, the court
pointed out that the complaint alleged the sensitive information on the
stolen laptops was the same sensitive information used to steal the
plaintiffs' identities. 4 4 The court consequently vacated the dismissal
of all counts, except a count for violation of a Florida statute concerning
confidentiality of medical information (which was inapplicable to AvMed)
and a count for violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing5 (which is not an independent cause of action under Florida
14

law).

In dissent, Judge William H. Pryor Jr. parted company with the
majority on the plausibility of the causation allegations. 146 Judge
Pryor concluded that "it is equally conceivable, in the light of the facts
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alleged in the complaint, that the unknown identity thieves obtained the
information from third parties."147

147.

Id. at 1331.

